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Article 4

PROCEDURAL REFORM AS A SURROGATE FOR
SUBSTANTIVE LAW REVISION
Jack B. Weinstein*
I have just returned from a fascinating ten days in the
Republics of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in central Asia, two
of the fledgling democracies in the former Soviet Union. I
travelled there with a group of lawyers from the City Bar
Association to consult with the Kyrgyz and Kazakh legal
communities as they engage in the exciting and sometimes
overwhelming task of shaping their new legal institutions.
Having survived such local customs as imbibing fermented
mare's milk, the national drink, and, as honored guest, eating
selected portions of a boiled sheep's head, I can now reflect on
our exchange. During this period on the steppes of central Asia
I was buoyed by the thought of food served by Brooklyn Law
School.
We have so many reasons to be thankful. For the Kyrgyz
and Kazakhs, the prospect of initiating legal reform without
many of the underlying support structures we enjoy-such as
highly professionalized lawyers and academics, a tradition of
judicial independence, a powerful written constitution
including strong separation of powers, and mechanisms for
judicial review, as well as support of the people, the press and
other branches of government-is a daunting one.
The former Soviet Republics have to deal with a judiciary
and bar subservient to party and the procuratura. We were
asked questions such as, "But why does the legislature or
prosecutor accept the court's declaration that a statute or
police conduct is unconstitutional?," and "Can you really tell
the prosecutor that he can't be present when the defendant
talks to his counsel or that he must release a defendant during
the months of investigation?" In my private talks with

* Senior

Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York. These notes were used for remarks at the Civil Litigation Symposium
Luncheon on May 7, 1993.
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members of the Constitutional Court they seemed lonely and
afraid. They need support from our bar and our judges. They
find it hard to understand how our legal system can be
adversarial and yet each element can be respectful of the
others.
The Kyrgyz and Kazakhs are rich in spirit and
determination. Their aspiration to develop modern legal
systems should remind us to treasure and husband the
enormous resources we have worked so hard to develop in
bringing to fruition a rule of law in which all are equal in our
courts. The simple opportunity to bring a lawsuit for harm
suffered due to the fault of another-something we take for
granted as a defining element of our legal system-is virtually
unavailable there. Yet the republics of central Asia, despite the
rural character of their lands, face many of the same modern
threats of toxic and environmental harm from which we have
come to expect the protection and redress afforded by our laws.
My journey has fortified my sense of caution, which I have
had occasion to express in recent years, about many of the
latest movements for procedural reform.' Change is not
necessarily progress.
The importance of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
simplifying practice, making our courts more readily accessible
and hastening disposition of lawsuits on the merits is now
recognized by all. These procedural reforms were essential in
clearing away the tangled obstacles that hampered the ability
of the public to obtain speedy airing of its grievances in our
courts. And easier access necessarily resulted in more equal
access. Our courts became more routinely available to those
without other means of recourse to defend and expand their
rights.
As procedural specialists we must be careful not to elevate
form over substance. We must not forget that our cherished
rules function in service of substantive outcomes. The
procedural reforms of the 1930s would have been only of
passing interest had they not been accompanied and followed

I See Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901
(1989); Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 1 (1988).
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by the vast expansion of federal substantive law that resulted
from the New Deal, the civil rights movement, the Great
Society, Vietnam, Watergate and the environmental
movement, as well as the accompanying growth and
liberalization of the common law in areas such as torts and
contracts.
In recent years the political pendulum has swung in the
other direction, towards the "haves" and away from the "havenots." We have witnessed a backlash against many equalizing
developments in the substantive law. Many recent procedural
reforms, some merely proposed and others actually adopted,
may represent a sub rosa aspect of this substantive backlash.
As guardians and keepers of the rules, proceduralists have a
duty to flush out these substantive arguments from behind
their procedural camouflage, exposing them to open and honest
debate. The public is entitled to be aware of and participate in
the law reform process. Discussions of substantive law that are
cast in the arcana of procedure may become elitist and
inaccessible. The public may discover too late that many of its
cherished legal rights have become devalued for lack of any
means to redeem them.
One reason I suspect that substance has been able to hide
behind recent efforts toward procedural change is that some of
the problems cited as justifications for these "reforms" are
grossly exaggerated. The supposed "litigation explosion!' is now
treated as a matter of consensus. Former Vice-President
Quayle and others have seized upon the few studies supporting
this view as political tools in fomenting public dissatisfaction
with lawyers and our legal institutions. These appeals
contribute little or nothing to meaningful debate about
procedure and only exacerbate the public's frustration. Those
more dispassionate members of the bench and bar who
nonetheless have joined the steady drumbeat of complaint
about our "hopelessly overburdened" courts also stoke these
fires and contribute to the pessimism that impedes real
progress.
The serious efforts to study the problem of increased
filings have revealed that the issue is far from clear.2 In fact,
2

See, e.g., MARC GALANTER, THE DEBASED DEBATE ON CIVIL JUSTICE (Disputes

Processing Research Program, Working Paper No. 5-6, 1992); INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL
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the most recent figures from the Administrative Office indicate
that the number of civil cases filed in the federal system
increased modestly from almost 211,000 filings during 1991 to
just over 229,000 filings in 1992.' This was the first increase
since 1988 and was attributed largely to fluctuations in the
numbers of student loan recovery and Social Security cases.
Over 231,000 civil cases were terminated in 1992, leaving over
224,000 cases pending, excluding some 26,000 asbestos cases
that were transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
These are hardly staggering numbers considering the size of
both the nation and the federal judicial system. Growth does
not seem to be occurring at an alarming rate.
Much of the hue and cry has been raised over tort actions.
Yet, recent studies indicate that the percentage of negligently
injured persons who bring lawsuits is in fact quite low and
that many legal, economic and social barriers still exist to the
bringing of cases. 4 We may be readopting a "blame-the-victim"
attitude towards tort cases. And while the absolute number of
cases has risen, our population and the scope of modern
hazards have also grown dramatically. Much of the increase in
numbers of cases can be attributed to a relatively few mass
torts, such as those involving asbestos and DES, which usually
involve a unitary problem affecting hundreds or thousands of
people.5
The so-called "war on drugs" is another factor that has had
great impact on the sense that our courts are overwhelmed.
This factor is sometimes overlooked in the civil justice debate.
Vast resources were expended during the 1980s in expanding
the investigation and prosecution of drug offenses. The

JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 18-23 (RAND 1993) (reporting study of jury verdicts and
costs of dispute resolution and concluding that the tort system is too heterogenous
to make generalizations about increased costs); Roxanne Barton Conlin, Litigation
Explosion Disputed, NAV'L L.J., July 29, 1991, at 26; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Bush
Report Not All That Controversial, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1991, at 13.

3 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, COURT ADMINISTRATION BULLETIN 2
(Mar. 1993) [hereinafter COURT ADMINISTRATION BULLETIN].
" See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1183-89 (1992).
' This is not to say that major changes are not required. See authorities
collected in Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Litigations, particularly
Chapter X (The Future) recommending bureaucratic protections. JACK B.

WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS SOCIETY (forthcoming 1994).
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executive branch made criminal law enforcement a top
priority. Congress expanded the scope of the narcotics laws and
adopted severe mandatory prison sentences. The numbers of
Assistant United States Attorneys grew exponentially. The
Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated, creating a whole
new field of intricate and arcane legal rules requiring regular
application and occupying the time and energies of our district
and appellate judges. Much of the nearly ten-percent increase
in the number of appeals filed in the circuit courts from 1991
to 1992 probably can be attributed to the routine appellate
review of sentencing decisions at the initiation of both
defendants and the government.
In the Eastern District of New York well over half of our
criminal cases involve drugs. The Administrative Office
estimates that twenty-seven percent of criminal cases
nationally involve the drug laws.6 I have spent most of my
time over the past year handling drug cases and most of that
work has consisted of pleas and sentencing. The bulk of the
cases involve low-level players in the narcotics trade who
rarely go to trial. It has been many weeks since I had a trial in
my courtroom. I have volunteered to assist the other judges in
trying civil cases but none have needed my help. The notion
that civil cases cannot get to trial in federal court because the
civil calendars of our trial judges are too clogged appears, from
where I sit, to be a myth.
More importantly, however, we can manage the growing
burden on our courts. Curtailing court access should be our
last, not our first resort in dealing with these problems. Claims
of discovery abuse, for example, are exaggerated. Increasing
utilization of magistrate judges and special masters to assist in
managing cases, supervising discovery and in settlement has
greatly expanded our ability to handle our workload. I do not
believe discovery abuse is a problem in our district. Abuses by
large law firms are being checked by our magistrate judges
and the corporations that will no longer pay inflated legal bills
for unnecessary discovery.
Yet, change after change in procedure has been designed
to reduce access to the courts on the ground of abuse:
*Venue over defendant corporations in diversity suits has
6 COURT ADMINISTRATION BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 3.
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been reduced.
*Minimum amounts in diversity cases have been
increased.
*Proposals to abolish diversity or further limit it are being
reactivated.
*Class actions have been discouraged by rules against
aggregating sums in dispute to meet minimum diversity
requirements and by appellate decisions.
-More detailed pleadings have been required and, now,
proposed detailed disclosure at the time the action begins
will place additional burdens on plaintiffs, some
defendants and the courts.
*Summary judgment-usually against plaintiffs-has been
expanded.
*Discovery as a part of the pleading will discourage
bringing suits.
•Use of discovery by plaintiffs after a suit is commenced
has been discouraged.
*Rule 11 and other sanctions, primarily against plaintiffs,
have deterred suits-particularly those involving civil
rights.
• Proposals to limit use of experts have been strongly
urged on almost baseless claims of widespread abuse.
*Increased fee proposals to make litigants "pay their way"
are common.
This tendency to discourage civil litigation demonstrates
that there is always the danger that the rulemaking process
can be activated to make access to the courts more difficult.
Were there a conservative Chief Justice, he or she could
control appointments to the rulemaking committees to staff
them with conservative procedural door-closers. Congress
would arguably not have sufficient interest or time to protect
adequately the procedural rights of claimants as a
counterbalance to the Supreme Court and the various federal
rulemaking committees.
Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") has been useful
and has great promise. We should proceed cautiously, however,
in replacing our courts with alternative fora. ADR is a
supplement to traditional adjudication, not a substitute. We
should remember that our goal in developing adjuncts to our
courts is to improve the functioning of the courts themselves,
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which are public facilities. The primary disadvantage of much
ADR is that one must purchase access to the system. A
situation in which the wealthy are able to gain speedy
resolution of their disputes while the disadvantaged must wait
in line for limited public resources would be regrettable.
Moreover, major areas of law may be unresolved if the courts
do not decide initial cases. Illustrative is the settlement of
almost all claims against lawyers in connection with alleged
bank fraud; we still do not know what the law requires a
lawyer to do in reporting a client's possible overreaching to
government agencies.
Moreover, the public has some right, I believe, to an open
airing of disputes in full view. Taxpayers would have a
legitimate gripe about funding a court system that diverted
commercial cases of potentially great public interest to
alternative fora hidden from the public's view. Litigant
satisfaction is also important to public support and the
legitimacy of our courts. Studies by RAND and others have
indicated that an airing of grievances before a judge in open
court has a cathartic effect and contributes greatly to the sense
of having received a fair hearing.' This has been my
experience informally with DES plaintiffs and in other cases. 8
We have had some success in the Eastern District utilizing
ADR techniques in a limited, supplementary fashion. We
provide a pamphlet to litigants explaining dispute resolution
facilities available in the district. These procedures include: a
court-annexed arbitration system under which a panel of
lawyers is available to hear cases parties wish to submit to
arbitration; an early neutral evaluation program that provides
a lawyer knowledgeable in the field to meet with the parties
early in the case to evaluate the merits; court-annexed
mediation providing a knowledgeable mediator to help the
parties arrive at settlement; consent to jury or court trial
before a magistrate judge; settlement conferences conducted by
a judge or magistrate judge; and appointment of special
'See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 39-41
(1990); Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REv. 89, 98-99 (1989); Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in
Defendants' Evaluations of their Courtroom Experience, 18 L. & SOC'Y REV. 51, 6768 (1984).
S See WEINSTEIN, supra note 5, ch. V (Ethics of Judges).
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masters to assist in case management, discovery and
settlement.
Much of the increased load on our courts can be attributed
to mass tort cases, a burden caused by the failure of legislators
to come to grips with what are really problems of national
substantive policymaking. In the absence of congressional
action, courts and lawyers have had to fashion ad hoc
responses to these problems. On the whole, the legal
community should be commended for its devoted efforts to
come to grips with mass cases. Our experience of the last
fifteen or so years in the area of mass torts illustrates that we
do have the capacity to handle new challenges facing our
courts and that cutting down on the numbers of cases is
neither a necessary nor a rational response to these problems.
Our legal system is capable, as it always has been, of the
growth and adaptation necessary to deal with change.
In continuing to address the challenge of mass cases,
honesty is our best policy. Rather than attempting to sweep
under the rug the difficult problems these cases present for the
courts by desperately searching for any means to cut down on
the volume of cases, we should debate openly how best to
handle the unique aspects of mass cases.
That debate should include open discussion of the ethical
problems mass cases present for lawyers and judges, a matter
about which I have spoken in a recent address at
Northwestern University.9 For example, lawyers often do not
communicate properly with what are sometimes thousands of
clients, their fees are disproportionately higher when based on
a contingency and thousands of cases will certainly result in
huge fees, requiring recovery as a basis for settlement. We
generally have avoided these difficult ethical questions,
making exceptions to our ordinary rules without stating so
openly, in the hopes that the problems will go away. But mass
cases are here to stay and so are the ethical dilemmas they
carry with them. I am hopeful that in mass cases, as in other
areas, genuine discussion of real problems of substantive and
procedural law will replace the unhelpful and distracting focus

I Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 469 (1994).
10 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 5, ch. III (Ethics of Lawyers).
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on numbers of cases and the calls to clear our courts of
problems we would prefer not to address.
A companion to the complaint that we are inundated with
lawsuits and suffer from litigation disease is the claim,
advanced by Peter Huber and others, that "junk science" is
routinely allowed into our courtrooms causing juries to reward
otherwise unworthy plaintiffs." The solution proposed to this
alleged problem is constriction of the legal rules that govern
admissibility of scientific evidence, a proposal recently rejected
by the Supreme Court. 2
As scientific understanding grows more sophisticated and
the cases before us become ever more scientifically complex,
judges struggle to keep pace with developments. This problem,
however, is not a new one. Judges and jurors are not scientists
and we have always had to determine how to adapt science to
the law's particular methods of factual development. Our goal
has been, and should remain, to foster full and clear
presentation and development of facts in the courtroom. The
Federal Rules of Evidence take a broad approach to the
admission of expert evidence and place faith in the courts' and
jury's ability to discriminate between the valuable and the
purely speculative.
The answer to concerns about science in the courtroom
should be to provide jurors with more information, not less.
Jurors are capable, under control of the court, of evaluating an
expert's credibility if they are provided with the relevant
information about the expert's work and the underlying field.
Erecting artificial barriers, such as "general acceptance within
the field," peer review standards and the like only imposes the
rules of the scientific community-with all of its own
shortcomings and biases--on our courts.1"
Leaving aside the context of the largely false debate over

1 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk
Scholarship, 42 Am. U. L. REV. 1637 (1993); Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge?
Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 HOFsTRA L. REV. 183, 186 (1992)
(book review) (criticizing work of Huber).
2 See Daubert v. Merrell Row Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993);
WEINSTEIN, supra note 5, ch. VII (Ethics of Scientists); Jack B. Weinstein, Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should not be Amended, 138
F.R.D. 631 (1991).
" WEINSTEIN, supra note 5, ch. VII (Ethics of Scientists).
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our supposed "litigation explosion," many of the recent
procedural reforms appear to me to be surrogates for direct
curtailment of substantive rights. This is because virtually all
of them share a common characteristic: they limit court access
and have a disproportionate impact on those without the
independent means to gain a fair hearing of their grievances.
I will not bore you with a rehash of the now familiar Rule
11 debate. I believe that it has become clear that routine
imposition of sanctions as a matter of rule-based mandate is
inconsistent with both the liberal access policy of the Federal
Rules and the overall American system of rewarding risktaking in the bringing of lawsuits. Sanctions have a
disproportionate impact on the poor and those without wellsettled legal expectations. A policy deliberately designed to
chill the bringing of lawsuits is unnecessary and is destructive
to our commitment to open courts. It potentially hampers
development of the law and, perhaps more significantly,
infuses our court proceedings with a spirit of meanness and
intolerance as parties seek to litigate ancillary questions of
lawyers' conduct having little to do with the merits of the
cases.
Imposition of more stringent pleading requirements for
various categories of cases has a similar effect and is a direct
retreat from the goal of the Federal Rules to allow easy entry
to the courthouse, permitting subsequent factual development
to discover the merits and value of the case.' 4 The same can be
said of efforts to "reform" discovery in response to the supposed
responsibility of "abusive" discovery practice for delays in the
system. 5 The recent proposed amendment to Rule 26 to

" The Supreme Court recently reversed a Fifth Circuit decision imposing a
heightened pleading standard in a civil rights case alleging municipal liability. See
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113 S.
Ct. 1160, 1161 (1993).
15 See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to
Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1992) (criticizing proposed amendment to Rule 26,
requiring mandatory disclosure before discovery practice, as likely to result in
inefficiency, delay and conflict with attorneys' ethical obligations). Compare George
F. Hritz, Plan Will Increase Cost, Delay Outcomes, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 13, 1993, at 2
(criticizing experimental mandatory disclosure rules in the Eastern District of New
York) with Charles P. Sifton, Experiment a Bold and Thoughtful Step, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 13, 1993, at 3 (defending experiment of the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York).
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mandate pre-discovery disclosure would disadvantage certain
types of plaintiffs since the disclosure requirements would be
determined with reference to the initial pleadings. 6 This
approach is in direct contravention of a system originally
premised upon liberal pleading followed by broad discovery to
develop the case. Such measures cannot help but result in less
information for plaintiffs who commence litigation with limited
7
resources and hinder speedy arrival at just settlements.
The Supreme Court decisions imposing greater burdens
upon plaintiffs seeking to survive summary judgment will
work together with discovery restrictions to make full
development of the merits of cases more difficult. 8 The Court's
curtailment of the standing doctrine also has limited the
ability of citizens to obtain private enforcement of laws
controlling the behavior of the government and other

entities. 9
The emerging trend toward variation in local rules and
practice, in part as a result of the Biden Bill,") threatens to
result in a disuniform and complex system with many of the
accessibility problems that predated the reforms of the
1930s.2 These measures threaten the enormous resource we
have fashioned-a uniform national practice with national
specialists capable of enforcing rights across the nation.
Dividing and conquering this system should be discouraged.
With the inevitable and unending growth in the volume and
complexity of the substantive law, our courts are intimidating
enough to the average citizen without our adding to the
problem by erecting additional procedural hurdles. The Federal
Rules were intended to minimize the barriers to court access.
See Bell, supra note 15, at 36 n.137 (quoting letter of Judge Ralph K.
Winter stating that little disclosure would be required in product liability cases
since these plaintiffs usually plead sparsely).
' See Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139,
143 (1993) (explaining how proposed amendment to Rule 26 to impose mandatory
disclosure in advance of discovery practice is likely to disadvantage plaintiffs in
personal injury and public interest litigation).
18 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
' See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
'o See Robert L. Haig & Warren N. Stone, Does All This Litigation "Reform"
Really Benefit the Client?, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. (forthcoming 1993) (examining
implementation of Civil Justice Reform Act).
21 See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of
Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992).
16
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Make no mistake about the substantive effect of these
changes in the procedural rules. Much of the expansion of
federal substantive law in the post-World War II period has
occurred in the area of civil rights. Our courts were opened to
claims sounding in bias based upon race, age, sexual
orientation, crippling diseases and disabilities. New procedural
restrictions are adopted in the bland name of supposedly
neutral concerns about docket clearing, frivolous cases and the
like. But the effect is to cut back on the opportunity for those
who may have suffered discrimination to get an airing of their
claims and the redress to which they may be entitled under
the substantive law.22
A similar dynamic has operated in the area of habeas
corpus, where frustration about supposed abuse of the federal
system has been used to justify strict new procedural rules
that result in the arbitrary elimination of many substantively
meritorious claims from the courts. 23 Those who may have

been wrongly imprisoned suffer because the judicial system
has determined that it cannot manage the volume of its work.
Surely we can be more humble in addressing our problems
than to pronounce arrogantly that the federal courts no longer
have the patience for plaintiffs who draft poorly, or cannot be
bothered with the repetitive claims of some prisoners or do not
have time any longer for diversity suits.
Perhaps most troubling has been the recent trend of
funding cutbacks. Once again procedure masks substance. Just
as the supposedly neutral and widely accepted problem of
budget deficits now crowds out meaningful discussion of social
policy in our legislatures, lack of funding and shifting funding
priorities in the judiciary have become indirect means of
controlling what types of cases come before our courts.
Shortages in funds are convenient excuses for the throwing up
22

According to Rule 48 of the 1991 amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

alternates will deliberate and vote with regular jurors. A deliberating jury

including alternates creates an increased barrier to a decision for the plaintiff
because a unanimous verdict must be reached by a greater number of people. For
another example of civil procedure's impact on practical balances between plaintiffs
and defendants, Cf. Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence
Trials; An Example of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L.
REV. 831 (1961).
' See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S.
Ct. 2546 (1991).
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of hands, and are means of avoiding responsibility for what
would be unpopular decisions were they made out in the open.
If our courts truly are overburdened-and I believe that they
are not-it is only because we have not been given the
resources to do our jobs.
Funding shortages are a particular problem in state
courts. Failure to grant salary adjustments and provide even
minimum electronic help has driven good judges out of the
system and discouraged others from entering it. But the
problem is also apparent at the federal level. In March 1993
we were told by the Administrative Office that we would not
be permitted to compensate civil jurors for their services after
May 12. Given the general requirement that jurors be paid, I
consider this probably an unconstitutional deprivation of the
right to jury trial. The justification given is that money is short
and that of course the criminal cases must go forward at all
costs. But it is the policies of the executive branch in vastly
increasing narcotics prosecutions that have caused such a
great increase in criminal cases. A situation has been created
whereby the courts have been "accidentally" and "regrettably"
closed off to certain types of litigants. Some question how
accidental this result is, just as some question whether the
current enormous budget deficits were not a deliberate means
of precluding substantive discussion of government funding of
social programs.
My journey two years ago to Russia and Latvia on behalf
of the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, and my recent
trip to central Asia on behalf of the City Bar Association
remind me of the importance of the basics. I was asked to
make a presentation in central Asia on the elements of an
independent judiciary, a matter of great concern to local
leaders who must build one from scratch and who have the
experience of having dealt with Soviet judges beholden to party
leaders in Moscow. My remarks focused on such elemental
matters as separation of powers, judicial review, life tenure,
salary guarantees and justiciability doctrines. I departed with
high hopes for these new nations as they seek to emulate a
system that has served us so well. And I returned home with a
reinvigorated appreciation for the wealth of our own legal
system.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the experience was the
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impression it left of a changed world. The relative ease with
which our group was able to travel across the globe, the lively
exchange of ideas we were able to have with a formerly remote
and isolated people and the dizzying pace of technological and
political progress in central Asia, Russia and the Baltic states
were all remarkable. It is difficult not to be enchanted by the
changes that are swirling about us.
Rapid change also has been accompanied in some regions
by terrible violence. The rule of law has been essential to the
maintenance of our own social compact. Breakdown of order in
countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Armenia, Iraq, the
Sudan, Peru and others stems in large part from a failure to
develop and maintain political and legal cultures founded upon
the rule of law.
It is our great challenge to deal with changes in a manner
that permits us to move forward without losing hold of the
basic elements that make our legal system so successful. I
want to thank the Brooklyn Law School and the Brooklyn Law
Review for bringing this group together. Without such
exchanges, we could not succeed in our mission of making the
rule of law available for all-rich and poor, powerful and
humble, or, as President Franklin Roosevelt put it, the "haves"
and "have-nots."

